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Abstract. This paper evaluates multidimensional poverty in European countries introducing two main 
novelties compared with the previous literature: first, the dimensions of poverty are selected on the basis of 
the shared values included in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; second, the whole 
space of feasible weights is used to summarise the multidimensional information, in order to remain agnostic 
about the importance given to the different deprivations. Using data from four waves of EU-SILC, the 
methodological innovations introduced here have allowed to produce a family of measures that capture the 
individual probability of being multidimensionally poor. Individual probabilities are then used to analyse the 
within and between distribution of multidimensional poverty in ten countries. Finally, they get combined with 
the generalised Lorenz dominance techniques in order to derive socially preferred distributions with the 
minimum load of value judgments. The novel methods proposed in this analysis allow to move from a dual 
definition of poverty, where poor and non-poor individuals are classified in a mutually exclusive context, to a 
continuous measure of deprivation, which allows to capture both the extensive and intensive margin of 
multidimensional poverty. 
 
Keywords: Multidimensional Poverty; Charter of Fundamental Rights; Hierarchy Stochastic Multicriteria 
Acceptability Analysis; Povertà multidimensionale, Carta dei Diritti Fondamentali; Analisi Stocastica di 
Accettabilità Multicriterio 
 
 
JEL codes I3; D63; C43 
  
 2 
1. Introduction  
There is widespread agreement on the need to conceptualise poverty as a multidimensional phenomenon. Low 
consumption or income is surely at the heart of the notion of poverty but several other domains, like poor 
human health, limited access to education and powerlessness, are systematically concerned by inadequate 
living standards (Ferreira and Lugo, 2013). 
Since the pioneering works of Tsui (2002) and Bourguignon and Chakravarty (2003), a number of 
approaches were developed to measure deprivation in multiple dimensions (see among others Alkire and 
Foster, 2011; Chakravarty et al., 1998; Cheli and Lemmi, 1995; Chiappero-Martinetti, 1994; Deutsch and 
Silber, 2005; Maasoumi and Lugo, 2008). However, multidimensional poverty measures are far from being 
universally welcomed. One of the main debates around them concerns the degree of arbitrariness used to define 
suitable dimensions and indicators of poverty, to set poverty thresholds, and to specify a system of weights to 
aggregate the various dimensions. 
To begin with, which dimensions matter and who should be selecting them are questions that repeatedly 
raise issues of ethics and legitimacy. The method most used for selecting dimensions is drawing on a list 
generated by public consensus.1 However, retrieving information on shared societal values is not 
straightforward when the analysis is carried out at international or even at the global level (Alkire, 2007). 
The identification of deprivation indicators and poverty thresholds – to be set both within and across 
indicators – requires further sensitive decisions, although they end up being data-driven in most cases, 
especially when the poverty analysis is performed in the ‘counting of deprivations’ framework (Alkire et al., 
2015). 
Relative weights attached to attributes of different nature are also a matter of concern. In the income-centred 
framework, prices are commonly used to aggregate components of consumption expenditure (or the incomes 
used to finance such consumption). They are then used to compose an index of aggregate consumption to be 
compared with an aggregate poverty line defined in the same space. Ideally, such an aggregation includes not 
only market goods and services, but also imputed values for non-market commodities, like public goods 
(Ravallion, 2011). Even though there exist different reasons why prices might not be ideal welfare weights2, 
they provide a clear understanding of the effects of the weighting scheme (Maasoumi and Lugo, 2008) as they 
explicitly address the issue of trade-offs between different goods and services, or the rate at which consumers 
are willing to trade one unit of an expenditure component for another (i.e., the marginal rate of substitution – 
MRS – between two goods). Moreover, MRSs play the important role of informing on whether two 
commodities, for every individual, are complementary, independent or substitutes – that is, whether, if we 
increase the quantity of one good, the final utility of the other increases, remains constant or decreases (Schultz, 
1935). 
                                                        
1 See for instance the Sustainable Development Goals experience (Fukuda-Parr, 2016). 
2 Among these: (i) the existence of externalities and missing or highly imperfect markets; (ii) the fact that price data are often 
geographically coarse, so actual price variation in space is missing from the information available to the researcher; and (iii) the regular 
need for imputing prices for market as well as for non-market goods (Bourguignon and Chakravarty, 2003; Ferreira and Lugo, 2013). 
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Similarly, in a multidimensional setting relative weights play the central role of determining trade-offs 
between dimensions. They reflect value judgments and possibly the very structure of social preferences. For 
these reasons, the setting of a weighting system is inevitably subject to the formulation of strong normative 
assumptions and ethical considerations on what a ‘good life’ is, and should be made as explicitly as possible. 
The literature provides an array of methods – normative, statistical, or hybrid – to set relative weights in a 
multidimensional context (Decancq and Lugo, 2013), although in practice, because well-being dimensions are 
deemed equally important from an ethical point of view, weights are often distributed equally among 
dimensions, as in the case of the Human Development Index (UNDP, 1990). Moreover, quantifying how many 
units of, say, education an individual would give up to compensate one extra year of life is a rather complicated 
task. In the first place, such an evaluation would require an amount of information that might not be easy or 
possible to retrieve. Second, the MRS between any two dimensions – that is, the amount of the first dimension 
that an individual is willing to give up for the second one while maintaining the same level of well-being 
(Decancq and Lugo, 2013) – could vary from an individual to another on the basis of the actual levels of the 
considered achievements, as in the case of age. 
This has relevant implications whenever one wants to compare not only individuals but also different 
territorial entities, like European Union (EU) countries. Empirically, assuming one specific vector of weights 
to be attached to a given set of dimensions may heavily affect both interpersonal comparisons and country 
rankings (Foster et al., 2013), leading to less robust results. 
This paper shows that it is possible to minimize the degree of arbitrariness commonly used to choose 
dimensions and weights in order to compare selected EU countries on the basis of a multidimensional poverty 
index. To this purpose, it first employs a normative approach to derive relevant dimensions from an expression 
of public consensus, that is the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (European Parliament, 
Council of the European Union, and European Commission, 2000). Then, drawing on the data on income and 
living conditions in the EU made available by Eurostat (EU-SILC), it addresses the issue of weighting 
dimensions by applying Stochastic Multicriteria Acceptability Analysis (SMAA) (Lahdelma and Salminen, 
2001), which allows to embody unknown preferences on the weights assigned to each dimension. Such an 
approach was previously used to investigate health outcomes, both in Italy and the US (Lagravinese et al., 
2019a, 2019b). In this article, SMAA techniques are used for the first time to construct a robust composite 
poverty index based on individual-level data for all feasible sets of weights. 
The article is organised as follows: in Section 2, the identification strategy to select the various dimension 
of poverty in EU countries is discussed, along with the choice of deprivation indicators and poverty thresholds. 
Section 3 introduces the SMAA methodology, while Section 4 presents the results from both a cross-country 
and a diachronic perspective, and analyses the overall inequality in the distribution of the probability of being 
multi-dimensionally poor, within and between countries, according to the Analysis of Gini (ANOGI) 
methodology (Liberati, 2015), adapted to a multidimensional setting as proposed by Lagravinese et al. (2019a). 
Finally, in Section 5 the Generalised Lorenz dominance technique is used to perform pairwise country 
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comparisons of the distribution of probabilities to rank them from a social perspective with the minimum load 
of value judgments. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. Assessing multidimensional poverty in the European Union 
Poverty measurement implies the accomplishment of two fundamental tasks: the first is to identify the poor 
among the total population; the second is to aggregate the information about the poor, either through the use 
of a poverty index (Sen, 1976) or by using dominance ordering (see, for example, Deaton, 1997). When 
performed in a multidimensional setting, the identification step requires to make several choices, including 
defining suitable dimensions and indicators, setting poverty thresholds whenever appropriate, and defining a 
system of weights. 
The information about the poor can be then aggregated either first across individuals and then across 
dimensions (e.g. the HPI, Anand and Sen, 1997), or first across dimensions and then across individuals (e.g. 
the Global MPI, Alkire and Santos, 2014). Each type of aggregation order has empirical advantages and 
disadvantages. Aggregating first across dimensions and then across people typically imposes a restricted 
choice of the usable data, which has to come from the same source for the studied population. Yet, poverty 
measures based on this kind of aggregation are very appealing as they are able to account for people’s 
simultaneous deprivations in different spheres of life. 
In the context of the EU, such kind of statistical source is represented by the European Union Statistics 
on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), which was launched in 2003 on the basis of an agreement 
between Eurostat and a number of Member States with the aim of providing timely and comparable annual 
data on variables such as income, social exclusion, material deprivation, health, education and labour at both 
household and individual level. Although the EU-SILC does not cover all the domains that could be of interest 
for a multidimensional poverty analysis, it is still wide enough to assess deprivations over multiple facets of 
life. Moreover, since 2010 it is also used for monitoring poverty and social exclusion in the EU in accordance 
with the Europe 2020 Strategy, reason why it appears to be an appropriate and sound basis of information to 
measure multidimensional poverty in the EU.  
 
2.1 Dimensions selection 
In order to produce reliable statistics, procedures for selecting life domains in a multidimensional setting 
should minimize the degree of arbitrariness. Alkire (2007) suggests different methods to select poverty 
dimensions, summarized in five main processes: (i) relying on existing data or convention; (ii) making 
normative assumptions; (iii) drawing on a list generated by consensus; (iv) using an ongoing deliberative 
participatory process; (v) using empirical evidence regarding people’s values. 
One method that is widely used within institutions at the global level is the public consensus one (see, 
e.g., the Human Development Index experience). As put by Alkire (2007), this method consists in identifying 
a set of dimensions that have been established through some consensus-building process at one point in time 
 5 
and are relatively stable. In some countries, it has been used to justify the exploitation of National Constitutions 
and laws to retrieve information on publicly agreed values – see the National Council for Evaluation of Social 
Development Policy experience in Mexico (CONEVAL, 2010) and some scholarly initiatives (Burchi et al., 
2014). 
Retrieving information on shared societal values is however not unequivocal when it comes to a 
supranational entity like the EU. One possible source of such a piece of information is the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, a document containing the declaration of the common values of 
the peoples of Europe (European Parliament, Council of the European Union and European Commission, 
2000). The Charter was incorporated into the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 and has since then come into legal force 
in Member States. It conveys a shared understanding of social justice and states the principles according to 
which the Union commits itself to fight poverty and social exclusion. The great majority of its articles deal 
with the domain of civil and political liberties and different kinds of freedoms (e.g., the right to life and the 
protection of human dignity, the right to the integrity of the person, the prohibition of slavery, forced labor, 
torture and degrading treatment, the right to security of the person, the respect for private and family life, the 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion, the freedom of expression, assembly and association). 
In addition, the Charter recalls other valuable life dimensions. The first one is decent work, or the right 
to employment opportunities for productive work and the possibility to deliver a fair income in conditions of 
freedom, equity, security and human dignity (ILO, 1999). Social solidarity appears as another possible 
dimension to value, which includes the right to the provision of social and economic protection, for instance 
through the access to services of general economic interest, consumer protection, the entitlement to social 
security benefits in the case of loss of employment, maternity, illness, dependency or old age and through the 
right to property. Finally, the broader concept of human development – or the right to the human flourishing 
of individuals in a just and protected environment – emerges from the Charter, through the right of education, 
the freedom of arts and sciences, the protection of human health and the environment. 
Even though it might not be considered as definitive, we start from this list of dimensions (summarized 
in Table 1) as a base of shared societal values to be used to inform the multidimensional assessment of poverty 
for EU countries. 
 
2.2. Deprivation indicators 
Regarding the choice of the indicators, the EU-SILC does not cover all the dimensions identified by the 
Charter. Variables accounting for the first dimension, Political and civil liberties, are completely missing in 
the database, the reason why this dimension will not be considered in the following analysis.3 
For the Decent work dimension, we follow the review of EU-SILC labour-related indicators provided in 
Tosi (2015) to select two relevant indicators: Activity status (PX050) and Low work intensity (RX050), 
                                                        
3 Acknowledging that it is not possible to retrieve in the data all the information that is considered theoretically essential does not 
constitute a shortcoming of the proposed approach. As also recommended by Robeyns (2003), an explicit and openly discussed 
selection of suitable life domains is a step that needs to be performed before endeavoring any kind of empirical assessment, so as to 
avoid relying only upon the available information and, possibly, to stimulate a more specifically targeted data collection. 
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respectively accounting for employment conditions and (quasi-) joblessness, as conceived by Eurostat as part 
of the composite indicator At Risk of Poverty and Social Exclusion rate (AROPE).  
Regarding the Social solidarity dimension, different indicators in the EU-SILC allow to capture the level of 
social protection offered to European citizens, e.g., through the variables Family/Children related allowances, 
Social exclusion not elsewhere classified, and Housing allowances. In fact, because all the policies just 
mentioned sustain people’s standard of living by integrating their income through the channel of monetary 
transfers, it appears reasonable to choose an income poverty indicator as a general proxy for this dimension. 
The variable Monetary poverty (after transfers) (HX080) is thus used to account for deprivations in the Social 
solidarity dimension. 
Finally, in the EU-SILC there are different variables that can be used to construct deprivation indicators in 
the last dimension, Human development. Some of them relate to human health, while some others refer to the 
educational attainment or to the quality of the living environment. The nine selected variables and the 
corresponding modalities are extensively commented in Tosi (2015) and outlined, along with all the chosen 
indicators, in Table 2. 
 
Table 1 – An application of the overlapping consensus method to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union 
Dimension Values and principles Articles of the Charter 
POLITICAL AND CIVIL 
LIBERTIES  
Human dignity, Right to life, Right to the integrity of the person, 
Prohibition of torture, slavery and forced labour, Right to security, 
Protection of personal data, Respect for private life and the right to 
marry, Freedom of thought, conscience and religion, Freedom of 
expression, assembly and association, Freedom of the arts and 
sciences, Right to asylum, Protection in the event of removal, 
expulsion or extradition, Equality before the law, Right to non-
discrimination, Protection of cultural, religious and linguistic 
diversity, Right to vote and to stand as a candidate at elections, 
Right to good administration, Right to petition, Freedom of 
movement and residence, Right to a fair trial, Presumption of 
innocence and right of defence 
1–13, 18–22, 39–50 
DECENT WORK Freedom to choose an occupation and right to engage in work, 
Equality of employment, work and pay for women and men, Right 
to information and consultation within the undertaking, Right of 
collective bargaining and action, Right of access to placement 
services, Protection in the event of unjustified dismissal, Fair and 
just working conditions, Prohibition of child labour, Protection 
from dismissal for a reason connected with maternity and right to 
parental leave 
15, 23, 27–33 
SOCIAL SOLIDARITY Freedom to conduct a business, Right to property, Social, economic 
and legal protection of the family, Right to social security and 
social assistance, Integration of persons with disabilities, Health 
care and protection, Access to services of general economic 
interest, Consumer protection 
16, 17, 26, 33, 34, 35, 36, 
38 
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT Freedom of the arts and sciences, Right to education, Health care 
and protection, Rights of the child, Rights of the elderly, 
Environmental protection 
13, 14, 24, 25, 35, 37 
Note: Articles 13, 33 and 35 fall in more than one dimension.  
Source: Authors 
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Table 2 – Identification strategy for a multidimensional poverty assessment in the EU 
Dimensions Indicators Variables Cut-offs 
DECENT 
WORK 
Unemployment  Activity status (PX050) 2=Employee 
3=Employed persons except employees 
4=Other employed 
5=Unemployed 
6=Retired 
7=Inactive 
8=Other 
Low work 
intensity 
Low work intensity (RX050) 0=No low work intensity 
1=Low work intensity 
2=Not applicable 
SOCIAL 
SOLIDARITY 
Income 
poverty 
Monetary poverty (HX080) 0=when HX090 >= at risk of poverty threshold (60% of 
Median HX090) 
1=when HX090 < at risk of poverty threshold (60% of 
Median HX090) 
HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT 
Low 
educational 
attainment 
Highest ISCED level 
attained (PE040) 
0=Pre-primary education 
1=Primary education 
2=Lower secondary education 
3=Upper secondary education 
4=Post-secondary education 
5=First stage of tertiary education (not leading directly to an 
advanced research qualification) 
6=Second stage of tertiary education (leading to an advanced 
research qualification) 
Bad self-
reported health  
General health (PH010) 1=Very good 
2=Good 
3=Fair 
4=Bad 
5=Very Bad 
Chronic illness  Suffers from chronic illness 
or condition (PH020) 
1=Yes 
2=No 
Unmet medical 
needs 
Unmet medical need for 
medical examination or 
treatment (PH040) 
 
+ 
Main reason for unmet 
medical need (PH050) 
1=Yes, there was at least one occasion when the person 
really needed examination or treatment but did not 
2=No, there was no occasion when the person really needed 
examination or treatment but did not 
 
1=Could not afford to (too expensive) 
2=Waiting list 
3=Could not take time because of work, care for children 
or for others 
4=Too far to travel/no means of transportation 
5=Fear of doctor/hospital examination/treatment 
6=Wanted to wait and see if problem got better on its own 
7=Did not know any good doctor or specialist 
8=Other 
Poor quality of 
dwelling 
Leaking roof, damp 
walls/floor/foundation or rot 
in window frames/floor 
(HH040) 
1=Yes 
2=No 
Inadequate 
sanitation 
facilities 
 
Bath/shower in dwelling 
(HH080/HH081) 
 
+ 
Indoor flushing toilet for sole 
use of the household 
(HH090/HH091) 
1=Yes, for sole use of the household 
2=Yes, shared 
3=No 
 
1=Yes, for sole use of the household 
2=Yes, shared 
3=No 
Noise Noise from the neighbours or 
from the street (HS170) 
1=Yes 
2=No 
Pollution Pollution, grime or other 
environmental problems 
(HS180) 
1=Yes 
2=No 
Crime Crime, violence or vandalism 
in the area (HS190) 
1=Yes 
2=No 
Modalities of the EU-SILC variables indicating deprivation are highlighted in bold. 
Source: Authors’ elaborations 
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2.3 The issue of relative weights 
One powerful critique to multidimensional poverty indices concerns the second issue described above, i.e. how 
to aggregate the different dimensions of poverty and thus how to set the weights attached to attributes of 
different nature. In their thorough investigation on weights in multidimensional indices of well-being, Decancq 
and Lugo (2013) explain that, in order to study how small changes in the achievements of different well-being 
dimensions can or cannot compensate each other, one needs to look precisely at the structure of weights. To 
this purpose, they introduce the MRS between two dimensions !" and !# as the amount of dimension 2 an 
individual is willing to give up for an extra unit of dimension 1, while maintaining the same level of well-
being. Formally, they define the MRS between dimensions !" and !#  as:  
 $%&'(,'* = ,-(/),/'" /	,-(/),/'*  
 
where -(/) is the well-being index and / is the vector of achievements for all ! dimensions. In fact, there exists 
different approaches to set relative weights in a multidimensional poverty analysis. Decancq and Lugo (2013) 
distinguish three classes: data-driven, normative, and hybrid. Data-driven approaches – like frequency-based 
weights, statistical weights (Krishnakumar and Nadar, 2008) and most-favorable weights (Melyn and Moesen, 
1991) – are a function of the distribution of the achievements in the society and are not based on value 
judgements about trade-offs between different life domains. 
Frequency-based weights often assign an inverse relation between the frequency of deprivation in a 
dimension and the weight of that dimension (e.g., Deutsch and Silber, 2005). The motivation behind such a 
relation lies in the idea that less frequent deprivations should have a higher weight because individuals would 
attach a higher importance to the shortfalls in dimensions where the majority in their society do not fall short, 
reason why some have also interpreted such weights as the “objective measures of the subjective feelings of 
deprivation.” (Desai and Shah, 1988, p. 52) 
Statistical weights, on the other hand, are often classified into two broad sets: multivariate statistical 
methods, among which the most commonly used technique is based on the Principal Component Analysis 
(Klasen, 2000; Noorbakhsh, 1998), and explanatory models based on the idea of the latent variable, like Factor 
Analysis (Noble et al., 2006), the Rasch model (Fusco and Dickens, 2008), multiple indicator and multiple 
causes models (MIMIC) (Di Tommaso, 2006), and structural equation models (Kuklys, 2005; Krishnakumar, 
2007; Krishnakumar and Ballon, 2008). 
Finally, the most-favorable weights technique, which has been widely used to set weights in well-being 
indices (see e.g., Despotis, 2005a, 2005b; Mahlberg and Obersteiner, 2001; Zaim et al., 2001) is a particular 
case of the data envelope analysis proposed by Melyn and Moesen (1991) and considers weights as individual-
specific and endogenously determined, i.e., the highest relative weights are given to dimensions in which the 
person performs best. 
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Conversely, normative approaches depend on value judgements about the MRSs. Weights can either be set 
in an equal or unequal way, although in any case they are assigned arbitrarily, that is according to particular 
considerations about specific trade-offs among dimensions. Arbitrariness could be overcome by following an 
‘expert opinion approach’, that is, letting experts or well-informed persons decide which particular weighting 
scheme to attach to different poverty attributes (see for instance Chiappero-Martinetti and von Jacobi, 2012). 
This latter method includes the Budget Allocation Technique (Moldan and Billharz, 1997; Chowdury and 
Squire, 2006; Mascherini and Hoskins, 2008), where experts are asked to distribute a budget of points to the 
different attributes, and the Analytic Hierarchy Process (Saaty, 1987), which compares dimensions pairwise 
and assigns for each round a score of importance. 
Lastly, hybrid approaches, like stated preference weights (Mack and Lansley, 1985; Halleröd, 1995a, 
1995b; de Kruijk and Rutten, 2007; Guio et al., 2009; Bossert et al., 2009) and hedonic weights (Schokkaert, 
2007; Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Freijters, 2004; Nardo et al., 2008; Fleurbaey, 2009) are a mix of the former two. 
As we will see in the next section, this paper tries to overcome the arbitrary choice of the set of weights, 
introducing a new methodology to measure multidimensional poverty. The aim will not be that of defining a 
specific poverty index for each individual, but that of estimating the probability that she/he will be below a 
given threshold for different vectors of weights. 
 
3. Measuring multidimensional poverty: an alternative approach 
Irrespective of the way of setting relative weights, all the above-mentioned approaches (i.e. data-driven, 
normative, and hybrid) use a single weight vector for all units (or in the case of most-favourable weights 
technique, a different weight vector for each unit) to reduce multidimensionality into a composite indicator. 
But the uniqueness of the vector of weights does not allow to take into account that, in a differentiated society, 
each individual may assign a different importance to each dimension. With only one vector of weights, 
representativeness may be valid only for a very small portion of the population. Since weights are likely to 
change according to individual preferences and needs, and since a “social” vector of weights could not be 
unanimously agreed upon, some studies have recently proposed to take into account the whole space of feasible 
vectors of weights in the evaluation process (Greco et al. 2018; Lagravinese et al. 2019a, 2019b). 
In particular, Stochastic Multicriteria Acceptability Analysis (SMAA) (Lahdelma and Salminen, 2001) has 
been shown to be the appropriate tool to make comparisons in a multidimensional framework, while remaining 
agnostic about the weighting schemes. This methodology has an appealing application in all cases where the 
individual characteristics, like poverty dimensions, have to be aggregated to obtain either social norms or 
rankings. 
Formally, using selected indicators from EU-SILC, the set of individuals 3 (4", … , 46), where 7	 =	176,518 in 2008, 7	 = 178,904 in 2010, 7	 = 181,864 in 2012, and 7	 = 182,912 in 2014, is evaluated 
on three dimensions (A", … , AB): 1. Decent Work; 2. Social Solidarity; and 3. Human Development. The 
composite indicator can be seen as the average of the three dimensions weighted by the weights (w) associated 
to each of them: 
 10 
 
(1) C-(4D,E) =FEGAG(4D)BGH"  
 
where EG reflects the importance given to the dimension I, and AG(4D) the achieved result of individual 4D for 
dimension I. As shown in Section 2.3, Decancq and Lugo (2013) list several procedures to set E, but as the 
order of importance given to diﬀerent indicators is a subjective choice, one single vector of E for summarising 
multidimensional poverty does not exist. 
 
3.1 Stochastic Multicriteria Acceptability Analysis 
In order to embody unknown preferences on the weights assigned to each dimension and to reduce the degree 
of arbitrariness in aggregating dimensions, SMAA considers the probability distributions JK(E) in the set of 
the feasible weights L (Lahdelma and Salminen, 2001): 
 
(2) L	 = 	 {(E", . . . , EB) ∈ %PB, E"+	. . . +EB = 1} 
 
The set of feasible weights is a (S − 1) dimensional simplex. In the absence of knowledge about the 
importance given to the different dimensions, a uniform weight distribution can be assumed in the set of 
feasible weights L. Defining UGD as the value of dimension AG for individual 4D, from the probability 
distributions JV(U) on W, where W is the evaluation space (in our case the space of the values assumed by the 
dimension AG in X), Lahdelma and Salminen (2001) introduce a ranking function attached to the individual 4D 
based on counting the dimensions in which a person is deprived: 
 
(3) Y4SZ(Z, U, E) = 1 + F[[C-(U], E) > C-(UD, E)]]`D  
 
where [(aYbc) = 1, and [(J4dec) = 0. Hence, the rank of individual 4D, for a given vector of weights E, is 
one plus how many times the weighted average of multidimensional poverty of 4D (C-(UD, E)) is dominated 
by the weighted average of multidimensional poverty of the other individuals (C-(U], E)). Thus, the value 
assumed by the variable Y4SZ(Z, U, E) in equation (3) is one plus the number of individuals that are more 
multidimensional poor than the individual 4D. Therefore, the lower the value of Y4SZ(Z, U, E) the higher the 
poverty of the individual 4D. 
Accordingly, for each individual 4D and for each value that can be taken by the three poverty dimensions U ∈ W, SMAA computes the set of weights for which individual 4D assumes rank Y: 
 
(4) LDf(U) = {E ∈ L: Y4SZ(Z, U, E) = Y} 
 11 
 
From equation (4), one can then compute the rank acceptability index: 
 
(5) hDf = i JV(U)j∈V i JK(E)k∈Klm(j) nEnU 
 
Equation (5) indicates the probability that the individual 4D has the Y-th position in the ranking, hDf , which 
is given by the ratio of the number of the vector of weights by which individual 4D gets rank Y to the total 
number of vector of weights considered. 
 
3.2 Hierarchy Stochastic Multi-Objective Acceptability Analysis 
The structure of the multidimensional poverty assessment presented in Section 2 is hierarchical: dimensions 
are in the first level and the different indicators are in the second level. In the SMAA context, the inclusion of 
a hierarchical structure has been proposed by Angilella et al. (2016) and De Matteis et al. (2018). In our 
poverty measure, each dimension AG ∈ X is given by the weighted sum of indicators oG' ∈ pG: 
(6) AG =FqG'oG'rs'H"  
 
In this case, the composite index of multidimensional poverty becomes the weighted average of dimensions, 
which are the weighted average of EU-SILC indicators. The new value function to aggregate the evaluations 
of an individual, from 3 with respect to the AG dimensions from X, with respect to the indicators from pG, is a 
double weighted average. For each individual 4D ∈ 3, we can estimate the following CI: 
 
(7) C-(4D,E, qD) =FEGFqG'oG'rs'H" (4D)BGH"  
 
where EG is the weight given to the dimension I, and qG' is the weight given to the EU-SILC indicator !. The 
Hierarchy Stochastic Multi-Objective Acceptability Analysis (HSMAA) allows to take into account of: (1) the 
uncertainty with respect to the weights assigned to the dimensions (as in the standard SMAA); and within 
dimensions (2) the uncertainty with respect to the weights assigned to the EU-SILC indicators. 
To this purpose, the HSMAA considers three probability distributions: JK(E), Jt(q); JV(U) on L, u; and W (De Matteis et al. 2017), respectively, where: 
 
(8) 
L	 = 	 {(E", . . . , EB) ∈ %PB, E"+	. . . +EB = 1} u = {(qG", . . . , qGr) ∈ %Pr , qG"+	. . . +qGr = 1, I = 1,…S} 
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and W is the space of the value that can be taken by the EU-Silc indicators oG' ∈ pG(I = 1,… , S). We introduce 
a ranking function relative to the individual 4D: 
 
(9) Y4SZ(Z, U, E, q) = 1 + F[vb(U], E, q]) > b(UD, E, qD)w]`D  
 
where [(aYbc) = 1, and [(J4dec) = 0. Then, for each individual 4D, for each evaluation of individuals U ∈W, and for each rank Y	 = 	1, . . . , 7, HSMAA computes the set of weights of dimensions for which individual 4D assumes rank Y: 
 
(10) LDf(U, q) = {E ∈ L: Y4SZ(Z, U, E, q) = Y} 
 
HSMAA evaluation is based on the computation of the rank acceptability index, which is the relative 
measure of the set of weight vectors for which the individual 4D gets rank Y: 
 
(11) hDf = i JL(E)k∈Klm(j) i JW(U)j∈V i Ju(q)x∈t nqnUnE 
 
where hDf  is the probability that individual 4D gets the Y-th position in the ranking. From a computational 
perspective, the multidimensional integrals defining the index are estimated using Monte Carlo simulations. 
In our application, we consider uniform probability distributions JK(E) on L and Jt(q) on u. As Tervonen 
and Ladhelma (2007) show that, to rank individuals, 10,000 extractions are a sufficient number to get an error 
limit of 0.01 with a confidence interval of 95%, we apply the HSMAA technique to 10,000 extractions of E 
and q vectors. 
We use the previously defined rank acceptability index hDf  to calculate a multidimensional measure of 
poverty. For each individual, we take the downward cumulative rank acceptability index of rank d, i.e. the 
probability that the individual 4D has a rank d or lower (Angilella et al. 2016). In symbols: 
 
(12) hDyz =FhDrzrH"  
 
Taking a specific threshold in the poverty ranking (we consider d = 20%, d = 10%, and d = 5%), hDyz 
measure the individual probability to be below that threshold, considering the whole space of feasible weights 
assigned to each dimension and indicator. It is worth noting that, to some extent, this approach can be 
interpreted as a generalization of the deprivation count approach recently developed by Aaberge et al. (2019), 
where the distributions of the deprivation count are separately considered over the space of dimensions of 
poverty. In our approach, the many dimensions of deprivations can instead be aggregated over the set of all 
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possible weights and transformed to get the average probability of each individual to be within a given 
percentage of the poorest population regardless of the specific number of deprivations. In other words, our 
generalization allows to estimate a robust probability of poverty that is not loaded with a specific method to 
aggregate the dimensions of deprivation. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. The probability of being multidimensional poor 
The results obtained from the application of the methodology above described are reported in Table 3. In 
particular, it shows the descriptive statistics of the individual probabilities of being among the poorest 20% of 
the European population by year, summarized by country. Of significant relevance, in almost all countries, is 
that given any set of weights, the median probability of being multidimensional poor is equal to zero, with the 
exceptions of Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy. This outcome is consistent both with the endeavor to provide 
a robust estimation of multidimensional poverty in the EU, where living conditions are on average among the 
highest in the world, and with the indicators chosen to inform the analysis, that aim at reflecting acute poverty. 
The highly-skewed shape of the probability distributions is illustrated for each country by means of the box 
plots (Figure 1). Due to the large outliers, country mean probabilities lie outside the interquartile range in most 
cases. However, for some Southern European countries – Greece, Spain, and Portugal – probability 
distributions are extremely sparse: even though country means are included in the interquartile range, extreme 
values attain the value of 1, as visually described by the overlapping of the maximum of the box plot and the 
upper bound of the probability distribution. 
In these countries, multidimensional poverty is more widespread than elsewhere in Europe, as there are 
some individuals who have 100% probability of being among the poorest 20% of the population regardless of 
the weighting scheme applied to the set of multidimensional poverty assessment. Belgium and Italy also feature 
quite sparse distributions, with an average maximum probability exceeding 50% (Belgium in 2010 and 2012) 
and 90% (Italy in 2012) of being among the poorest 20%. Conversely, in Austria, France, Germany, 
Luxembourg and the UK, probability distributions are narrower and very close to zero, suggesting a greater 
robustness of the individual probabilities of being in the group of the multidimensional poorest 20% to changes 
of the weighting scheme attached to different poverty dimensions. 
With regard to the diachronic perspective, it is worth noting that, within countries, the steadiness of country 
means across the years suggest that the overall probabilities of being multidimensional poor do not vary 
drastically over time. In some cases, however, changes from one year to the next appear to be more meaningful 
when even small variations of the means are associated to a substantial increase (or decrease) of the 
interquartile range. This is the case, for instance, of Belgium, where the probability of being poor durably 
increase after 2008 due the increased sparsity of individual probabilities in the range between 0 and 25%. 
Greece and Italy, on the other hand, show a larger variability in the probability of falling into the poorest 
20% in 2012 compared to the previous years, while Portugal see its probability distribution becoming even 
 14 
sparser in 2014. In all these cases, the discontinuity appears to be also driven by an enlargement of the 
proportion of individuals who have non-zero probability to be in the lowest quintile of the distribution: it 
increases by almost 7 percentage points in Greece and by 4 percentage points in Italy between 2010 and 2012; 
and it grows by 62 to 65% in Portugal between 2012 and 2014 (see the last column in Table 3). 
The contribution in terms of densities to the shaping of the overall probability distributions is even clearer 
looking at the violin plot (Figure 2), which combines a box plot with the information conveyed by a kernel 
density plot for all probability distributions by country and year. From the graph, it is easy to see how two 
apparently similar distributions (as per the interpretation of the box plot) can differ in terms of concentration 
of the observations along the vertical line representing the possible values taken by each individual 
observation.4 From the violin plot, it is observed that Greece, Spain (particularly in years 2008 and 2010), Italy 
(in 2008), and Portugal show a less flat probability of individuals taking non-zero values, corresponding to a 
higher average probability for their observations of being in the poorest quintile. 
Back to Figure 1, also the UK shows a spike in 2014 indicating greater sparsity of individual probabilities 
compared with the 2008–2012 period, sustained by both a growing proportion of the population who has a 
non-zero probability of being poor (given all possible sets of weights assigned to poverty dimensions), and the 
rise – from 6 to 7 – in the average number of joint deprivations experienced by the same share of population. 
Conversely, in Luxembourg the probability of being multidimensional poor diminishes from 2010 onwards, 
due to both the reduction of the number of individuals who report a non-zero probability of being poor and the 
reduction in the average number of deprivations experienced by those who fall into the group of the poorest 
20%. The last group of countries – Austria, Germany, and France – shows a constant or diminishing overall 
probability of being among the multidimensional poorest 20% over time. For those countries, within country 
variations are only imputable to a greater concentration around zero of the distribution of individual 
probabilities. 
Concerning the two other sets of probabilities computed in this analysis (tables are reported in Appendix), 
all countries have some proportions of individuals with non-zero probability of being among the poorest 10% 
increase over time. In the case of Greece, that proportion is the second highest one in Europe (44% on average 
in the period 2008-2014) after Portugal. A distinctive pattern is observed for France, where the proportion of 
individuals with non-zero probability of being into the poorest 10% for any set of weights increase in 2014. 
That reverses the downward trend observed for the probability distribution relative to the bottom quintile. 
Finally, the UK confirms the same pattern also when considering the probability to fall into the poorest 
10% and the poorest 5% of the population. The proportion of individuals who have non-zero probability to be 
in the bottom tenth percentile and the bottom fifth percentile of the distribution increases between 2012 and 
2014 (respectively, from 27.6% to 35.1% when considering the 10% threshold and from 18.6% to 23.3% for 
the 5% threshold). Moreover, in the same period the average number of deprivations increases by 1 for those 
in the last decile and by 2 – from 7 to 9 – for those who are in the bottom 5%. 
                                                        
4 One example is given by Italy, featuring quite different density plots for years 2008 and 2010 in Figure 2 while being seemingly not 
distinguishable in the box plot shown in Figure 1. 
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Table 3 – Probabilities of being among the poorest 20% of the population by year and country 
Year mean sd p25 p50 p75 
% population 
with 
Prob20%>0 
Average N of 
deprivations if 
Prob20%>0 
 AT 
2008 0.157 0.32 0 0 0.011 40.4 7 
2010 0.164 0.32 0 0 0.071 39.7 7 
2012 0.153 0.32 0 0 0.009 40.3 6 
2014 0.135 0.30 0 0 0.007 37.3 6 
 BE 
2008 0.191 0.35 0 0 0.083 46.3 6 
2010 0.204 0.36 0 0 0.261 44.3 6 
2012 0.207 0.36 0 0 0.242 46.7 7 
2014 0.186 0.35 0 0 0.184 44.0 7 
 DE 
2008 0.161 0.32 0 0 0.076 44.8 6 
2010 0.160 0.32 0 0 0.071 42.9 6 
2012 0.155 0.32 0 0 0.065 43.4 6 
2014 0.158 0.32 0 0 0.056 42.4 7 
 EL 
2008 0.251 0.38 0 0.006 0.544 56.7 7 
2010 0.266 0.38 0 0.006 0.568 57.0 6 
2012 0.310 0.40 0 0.009 0.764 63.7 6 
2014 0.262 0.38 0 0.005 0.532 58.7 6 
 ES 
2008 0.230 0.37 0 0.005 0.424 53.6 6 
2010 0.241 0.37 0 0.004 0.543 52.3 6 
2012 0.243 0.38 0 0 0.532 50.8 6 
2014 0.251 0.38 0 0.003 0.521 52.5 6 
 FR 
2008 0.162 0.32 0 0 0.078 46.7 7 
2010 0.158 0.32 0 0 0.074 45.2 7 
2012 0.155 0.32 0 0 0.065 44.6 6 
2014 0.146 0.31 0 0 0.055 41.3 7 
 IT 
2008 0.218 0.36 0 0.004 0.273 52.6 7 
2010 0.207 0.35 0 0 0.266 48.7 7 
2012 0.217 0.36 0 0 0.395 52.2 6 
2014 0.212 0.34 0 0.004 0.310 53.1 7 
 LU 
2008 0.213 0.36 0 0 0.259 47.9 7 
2010 0.187 0.34 0 0 0.079 43.1 6 
2012 0.167 0.32 0 0 0.074 43.4 6 
2014 0.160 0.31 0 0 0.062 42.0 6 
 PT 
2008 0.236 0.37 0 0.006 0.413 58.9 7 
2010 0.249 0.37 0 0.007 0.543 58.3 7 
2012 0.256 0.38 0 0.007 0.490 62.1 6 
2014 0.269 0.37 0 0.007 0.683 65.0 7 
 UK 
2008 0.195 0.35 0 0 0.080 49.4 6 
2010 0.188 0.35 0 0 0.075 43.1 6 
2012 0.182 0.34 0 0 0.071 44.6 6 
2014 0.206 0.34 0 0 0.310 47.6 7 
Source: Authors’ elaborations on EU-SILC data (2008–2014)  
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Figure 1 – Distributions of the probability of being among the poorest 20% of the population by country and year 
(box plots) 
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Source: Authors’ elaborations on EU-SILC data (2008–2014)  
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Figure 2 – Distributions of the probability of being among the poorest 20% of the population by country and year 
(violin plot) 
 
Note: The wider sections at the bottom of the plot indicate a higher probability of individuals taking the value of zero, 
while thinner sections correspond to lower probabilities.  
Source: Authors’ elaborations on EU-SILC data (2008–2014) 
 
4.2. The multidimensional ANOGI 
As shown in Greco et al. (2018) and Lagravinese et al. (2019a), for any given rank (d), the downward 
cumulative rank acceptability indices (hDyz, Z = 1,… ,7), defined in equation (12), can be used to estimate the 
multidimensional generalization of the Gini index, and the multidimensional generalization of the Analysis of 
Gini (ANOGI) as formalised by Yitzhaki (1994) and extended in Liberati (2015).  
Using the three specific thresholds in the poverty ranking and hDyz as a measure of the individual probability 
of being poor, the multidimensional generalization of the Gini index and the multidimensional generalization 
of the ANOGI is estimated by first transforming hDyz in an outcome that can be used to approximate the usual 
ranking from the poorest to the richest individual. To this purpose, and for convenience of interpretation, we 
take the complement of hDyz, which is the individual probability of being non-poor. Formally: 
 
(13) hD|z = F hDr6rHzP"  
 
where hD|z is now the upward cumulative rank acceptability index. Thus, for any given d, hD|z  measures the 
individual probability of being above d, i.e. the probability of being non-poor. 
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Given (13), the Gini index of the upward cumulative rank acceptability index of rank d can be estimated as 
follows: 
 
(14) X|z = ∑ ∑ ~h]|z − hD|z~6DH"6]H" 27d  
 
where X|z measures how the probabilities of attaining a rank higher than d are concentrated among individuals. 
For each threshold in the poverty ranking (d), the higher X|z, the more concentrated the probabilities to be 
above this threshold, which would suggest that probabilities of being non-poor are heavily concentrated in a 
small number of individuals. If these probabilities were the same for all individuals X|z would be zero. 
The ANOGI decomposition of X|z, according to the extension developed in Liberati (2015), can be 
obtained as follows: 
 
(15) 
X|z =F eGGXG|zÄÅÇÅÉÑÖÜBáÜfá	Kà + F eGXG|zF ''`GG â'G|zÄÅÅÅÅÅÅÇÅÅÅÅÅÅÉà6äÜãÖ	åç	åxéfzÜääGBè	åB	Kà +G Xêä|zëÑÖÜBáÜfá	êà + vXê|z − Xêä|zwÄÅÅÅÇÅÅÅÉà6äÜãÖ	åç	åxéfzÜääGBè	åB	êà 
 
The first term is the within-country inequality (WI) in the absence of overlapping, where XG|z is the Gini 
within country I, eG is the share of the probabilities within country I of being above the rank d, and G is the 
share of population of country I. The second term is the impact of overlapping on within inequality, driven by 
the contribution of the overlapping index of each country with all other countries (â'G|z) weighted by their 
population shares. 
The last two terms of equation (15) deal with the between-country inequality (BI). The term Xêä|z =#ãåxíìîïñññññs,óñsvìîïwòìîïñññññ  is the between-country inequality as defined in Pyatt (1976), with the covariance of the mean 
probability of each country h|zññññG and its rank in the distribution of the mean probabilities of all countries ôñGvh|zw. This definition implies that Xêä|z = 0 when all the country-level mean probabilities are equal. Instead, 
according to Yitzhaki and Lerman (1991), one can define Xê|z = #ãåxíìîïñññññs,óñvìîïwòìîïñññññ , which is based on the 
covariance between the mean probability of each country h|zññññG and the average rank of all individual 
probabilities in the country in the overall distribution of probabilities ôñvh|zw. In this case, Xê|z = 0 implies 
that the average rank of all individual in the overall distribution would be equal for all countries.  
It is easy to see that the diﬀerence between the two formulas lies in the rank that is used to represent the 
country. Under Pyatt’s approach, that rank is the rank of the country-level mean probability, while under the 
approach by Yitzhaki and Lerman it is the mean of the ranks of probabilities of individuals belonging to the 
country. These two approaches yield the same ranking in the case of perfect stratification. This implies that in 
the absence of overlapping of probabilities, between-inequality would be uniquely defined by Xê|z. With 
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overlapping, instead,	Xê|z − Xêä|z < 0, which can be interpreted as the reduction in between inequality caused 
by the overlapping of probabilities. 
Finally, the term â'G|z is a measure of how the distribution of probabilities in country I overlaps with the 
distribution of probabilities in another country !. If no individuals in country ! lies in the range of the 
distribution of probabilities in country I, this latter would be a perfect stratum and â'G|z = 0. Thus, if all 
countries were perfect stratums, the second term on the right-hand side of (15) would collapse to zero. This 
would suggest that all countries have a within distribution of probabilities that is not within the range of any 
other country. On the other hand, since â'G|z ≤ 2, the maximum value is achieved when all probabilities 
associated to country ! that are located in the range of I are concentrated around the mean of the distribution I. This implies that the probabilities of country ! would split the probabilities of country I that are below the 
average from those that are above the average. It is worth noting that the higher â'G|z, the lower will be âG'|z, 
which is obtained by switching the country used as a baseline.  
Formally, the overlapping coefficient is defined as follows: 
 
(16) â'G|z = cov íhG|z, ô'vh|zwòcov íhG|z, ôG(h|z)ò 
 
where the numerator is the covariance between the upward cumulative rank acceptability indices for rank d in 
country I, and their ranking in the distribution of the upward cumulative rank acceptability indices in country !. The denominator, instead, is the covariance between the same upward cumulative rank acceptability indices 
and their ranking within the country I. 
Table 4 shows the calculation of the multidimensional ANOGI as in equation (15), which give information 
on how the individual probabilities of being above the poorest 20% are concentrated, both within and between 
the ten European countries here considered. As shown in the second column, the total inequality of the 
distribution of probabilities has not changed significantly between 2008 and 2014. Yet, some changes can be 
observed in the individual components of the Gini index. In particular, the standard within component has a 
slight monotonic decrease (from 0.027 in 2008 to 0.024 in 2014). Furthermore, while the impact of overlapping 
on within inequality remains quite constant, the intensity of the between component of total inequality 
increased from 0.021 to 0.032. This suggests that the average probabilities of being poor, among countries, are 
increasingly more dispersed, even though they are more intertwined, as suggested by the increasing negativity 
of the impact of overlapping on between inequality (from -0.019 to -0.027). These time trends are robust and 
confirmed when moving the threshold of poverty both at 10% and at 5% (see Tables A3 and A4 in the 
Appendix). 
 
 
 
 21 
Table 4 – Multidimensional ANOGI of the probabilities of not being among the poorest 20% (2008-2014) 
Year Total Inequality Standard WI Impact of overlapping on WI Standard BI 
Impact of 
overlapping on BI 
2008 0.196 0.027 0.167 0.021 -0.019 
2010 0.197 0.025 0.169 0.025 -0.022 
2012 0.197 0.024 0.169 0.031 -0.027 
2014 0.197 0.024 0.168 0.032 -0.027 
Source: Authors’ elaborations on EU-SILC data (2008–2014) 
 
Table 5, instead, shows detailed statistics of inequality by country. Lower levels of inequality are observed 
in Austria, Germany, and France, which have Gini coefficients of 0.153, 0.158, and 0.158 respectively. Higher 
inequality is instead observed in Greece, Portugal, and Spain, in which Gini coefficients are 0.241, 0.226, and 
0.222 respectively. This outcome is consistent with the fact that the first three countries, compared with the 
latter three, have a higher frequency of persons that are not classified as poor, so that their distribution of 
probabilities is less concentrated. It follows that countries where the probabilities of being non-poor are lower 
are also those countries with the highest inequality of the distribution of probabilities. 
The same outcome occurs when moving the poverty threshold to 10% (see Table A5 in Appendix), while 
in the case of 5%, there are significant changes in the ranking. Although the overall negative correlation 
between Gini and the average probability at country level remains significant, considering the poverty 
threshold at 5%, the three countries with the highest Gini are Belgium, Italy and Portugal (0.060, 0.056, and 
0.056 respectively), while the three countries with the lowest Gini are Austria, the UK, and France (0.031, 
0.040, and 0.042 respectively) (see Table A6 in Appendix). In both cases, however, the sizes of the Gini 
coefficients are smaller than in the previous cases, suggesting that the corresponding distributions, as expected, 
are closer to the equidistribution line in the sense that there are a greater number of persons having a 100% 
probability of not being among the poorest part of the population. 
 
Table 5 –Detailed statistics of inequality of the probabilities of not being among the poorest 20%, by country (2008) 
Country N p mean s G O 
AT 10,846 0.061 0.843 0.065 0.153 1.056 
BE 10,073 0.057 0.809 0.058 0.186 1.044 
DE 22,834 0.129 0.839 0.136 0.158 1.031 
EL 13,486 0.076 0.749 0.072 0.241 0.954 
ES 27,784 0.157 0.770 0.152 0.222 0.988 
FR 19,493 0.110 0.838 0.116 0.158 1.006 
IT 42,532 0.241 0.782 0.236 0.210 0.979 
LU 7,486 0.042 0.787 0.042 0.207 1.034 
PT 8,505 0.048 0.764 0.046 0.226 0.928 
UK 13,479 0.076 0.805 0.077 0.190 1.009 
Note: N = Number of observations; p = Share of population; mean = Average Upward cumulative rank acceptability 
index; s = Share of probability of being above 20% of poverty; G = Gini coefficients; O = Average overlapping. 
Source: Authors’ elaborations on EU-SILC data (2008) 
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Table 6 reports the matrices of â'G|#ü% for 2008, obtained by the decomposition of the general overlapping 
index, with rows indicating the baseline country I and columns reporting each country !. By construction, each 
element of the main diagonal of this matrix equals one. If no person in country ! lies in the range of the 
distribution of probabilities of persons in country I, country I could be defined a perfect stratum and â'G|#ü% =0. Table 6 reports no cases in which cells equal zero, which means that it is always the case that there are 
individuals in country ! that lie in the distribution of probabilities of individuals in country I. As a matter of 
fact, none of the 10 European countries considered in this study can be considered a perfect stratum, as in each 
country there are people that have some probability of being among the poorest 20% of the European 
population, and these probabilities overlap among countries. Considering the average overlapping (i.e., 7c4S'`G(â'G|#ü%), not reported in matrix), lower indices – i.e., a higher stratification – is found in Portugal, 
Greece, and Italy (0.928, 0.954, and 0.979 respectively). On the opposite side, higher indices, i.e. a lower 
stratification, are found in Austria, Belgium, and Luxembourg, with average overlapping of 1.056, 1.044, and 
1.034 respectively. The combination of these two results suggests that there are relatively more people from 
poorest countries in the range of the distribution of less poor countries, than there are people in richer countries 
in the range of the distribution of the poorest countries. As an example, we can consider the relationship 
between Austria and Portugal. Taking Austria as a baseline, in 2008 â†°|#ü% = 1.118, while taking Portugal as 
a baseline â°†|#ü = 0.860. This means that there are relatively more people in Portugal overlapping the 
distribution of people in Austria than there are people in Austria overlapping the distribution of Portugal. 
Overall, however, the matrix of overlapping, to some extent as expected from the fact that we are 
considering European countries with similar economic structures, shows that the distribution of the 
probabilities among countries are significantly intertwined. The same outcome occurs when moving the 
threshold of poverty to 10% and 5% (See Table A7 and Table A8 in Appendix).5 
 
Table 6 – Overlapping matrix of the probabilities of not being among the poorest 20% (2008) 
 AT BE DE EL ES FR IT LU PT UK 
AT 1 1.016 1.033 1.086 1.062 1.059 1.074 1.016 1.118 1.049 
BE 0.979 1 1.012 1.088 1.057 1.036 1.065 1.012 1.114 1.036 
DE 0.967 0.988 1 1.074 1.043 1.023 1.052 0.998 1.099 1.024 
EL 0.892 0.910 0.921 1 0.966 0.943 0.976 0.923 1.022 0.947 
ES 0.923 0.942 0.955 1.034 1 0.978 1.010 0.955 1.058 0.979 
FR 0.942 0.963 0.977 1.046 1.016 1 1.026 0.972 1.074 0.996 
IT 0.916 0.935 0.947 1.023 0.991 0.970 1 0.947 1.047 0.971 
LU 0.974 0.989 1.003 1.075 1.044 1.026 1.053 1 1.098 1.030 
PT 0.860 0.882 0.891 0.980 0.942 0.912 0.952 0.900 1 0.918 
UK 0.946 0.965 0.980 1.047 1.018 1.006 1.029 0.969 1.077 1 
Source: Authors’ elaborations on EU-SILC data (2008–2014) 
 
                                                        
5 To give a synthetic indication of the closeness of the outcome, one can consider that the rank correlation between 7c4S'`G(â'G|#ü%) 
and 7c4S'`G(â'G|"ü%) is 0.903 and rank correlation between 7c4S'`G(â'G|"ü%) and 7c4S'`G(â'G|"ü%) is 0.951. 
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Moving the analysis to 2014, Table 7 reports the corresponding statistics of inequality in the distribution of 
probabilities. Countries with lower Gini coefficient in 2014 are Austria, France, and Luxembourg, with values 
of 0.132, 0.143, and 0.154 respectively. Comparing these three values with values in the same countries in 
2008, a significant decrease in all the three Gini coefficients can be noted, in particular in Luxembourg in 
which the Gini coefficient decreases from 0.207 to 0.154. As a general tendency in those countries, a reduction 
of the Gini index implies that the distribution of the probabilities is less unequal, i.e. that the concentration of 
the probabilities of being non-poor has further reduced. The decrease of the Gini coefficient in Luxembourg 
is even more evident when moving the poverty threshold to 10% and to 5% (Table A9 and Table A10 in the 
Appendix).  
Countries with higher within Gini coefficient in 2014 are Portugal, Greece, and Spain with a value of 0.255, 
0.250, and 0.243 respectively. These three countries were also the three countries with the highest Gini in 
2008, but, unlike the previous case, all these countries have experienced an increase of the Gini coefficients 
from 2008 to 2014, which means that the concentration of the probabilities of being non-poor is even more 
concentrated than before. 
Overall, however, the ranking of countries has not significantly changed, as the rank correlation between 
country-level Gini coefficients in 2008 and country-level Gini coefficients in 2014 is 0.906. Moving the 
poverty threshold to 10% and to 5%, the ranking in terms of Gini is still significantly correlated, with two main 
deviations represented by the above-mentioned Luxembourg and the UK (Table A9 and Table A10 in the 
Appendix). 
 
Table 7 –Detailed statistics of inequality of the probabilities of not being among the poorest 20%, by country (2014) 
Country N p mean s G O 
AT  10651 0.058 0.865 0.063 0.132 1.065 
BE  11236 0.061 0.814 0.063 0.182 1.070 
DE  21462 0.117 0.842 0.124 0.155 1.058 
EL  17768 0.097 0.738 0.090 0.250 0.944 
ES  26049 0.142 0.749 0.134 0.243 1.027 
FR  20659 0.113 0.854 0.121 0.143 1.048 
IT  38604 0.211 0.788 0.209 0.202 0.944 
LU  7891 0.043 0.840 0.046 0.154 1.009 
PT  14579 0.080 0.731 0.073 0.255 0.867 
UK  14013 0.077 0.794 0.076 0.197 1.000 
Note: N = Observation; p = Share of population; mean = Average Upward cumulative rank acceptability index; s = Share 
of probability of being above 20% of poverty; G = Gini coefficients; O = Average overlapping.  
Source: Authors’ elaborations on EU-SILC data (2014) 
 
Finally, Table 8 shows the overlapping matrix for 2014. As in 2008, there are no cases in which cells equal 
zero, which means that also in this case none of the 10 European countries can be considered a perfect stratum 
in 2014. On average, higher levels of overlapping are in Belgium, Austria, and Germany, while Portugal, 
Greece and Italy are more stratified in their distribution of probabilities. Yet, the rankings in terms of average 
overlapping between 2008 and 2014 are positively correlated (0.843). The main changes in the ranking are for 
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Luxembourg, which means that the country has experienced an increasing stratification process from 2008 to 
2014, as it increased the average probability of being non-poor and it reduced its concentration at country level. 
As in 2008, the ranking of countries in average overlapping does not change significantly moving the 
threshold of poverty to 10% and 5% in 2014 (See Table A11 and Table A12 in the Appendix). Rank 
correlations of average overlapping, indeed, remains high, being 0.945 between 20% and 10% poverty 
thresholds and 0.977 between 10% and 5% poverty thresholds. 
 
Table 8 – Overlapping matrix of the probabilities of not being among the poorest 20% (2014) 
 AT BE DE EL ES FR IT LU PT UK 
AT 1 1.001 1.018 1.104 1.024 1.024 1.121 1.051 1.181 1.065 
BE 0.987 1 1.010 1.123 1.041 1.014 1.127 1.044 1.202 1.072 
DE 0.979 0.989 1 1.107 1.025 1.005 1.115 1.035 1.186 1.059 
EL 0.859 0.874 0.879 1 0.918 0.885 1.002 0.920 1.076 0.949 
ES 0.940 0.955 0.962 1.082 1 0.967 1.085 1.001 1.162 1.031 
FR 0.975 0.981 0.995 1.092 1.011 1 1.105 1.030 1.171 1.050 
IT 0.873 0.879 0.890 0.988 0.907 0.897 1 0.931 1.059 0.945 
LU 0.951 0.949 0.967 1.043 0.965 0.974 1.060 1 1.112 1.007 
PT 0.778 0.794 0.800 0.925 0.839 0.804 0.929 0.845 1 0.871 
UK 0.937 0.936 0.952 1.037 0.957 0.960 1.056 0.990 1.111 1 
Source: Authors’ elaborations on EU-SILC data (2014). 
 
The main findings of the ANOGI can thus be summarised as follows. From 2008 to 2014, the total 
inequality of the individual probabilities of being non-poor in the 10 EU countries considered here has not 
changed significantly, yet there has been a non-negligible increase of inequality between countries. This 
increase can be partially explained by an increase of the average probability of being non-poor in countries 
having higher average probability of being non-poor in 2008 (in particular Austria, Luxembourg and France), 
and a decrease of the average probability of being non-poor in countries having lower average probabilities of 
being non-poor in 2008 (i.e. Portugal, Spain, and Greece). This process has increased the distance between 
countries with lower average probabilities and countries with higher average probabilities of being non-poor. 
Furthermore, there is evidence of an increase of the inequality of the probabilities within those countries with 
low average probabilities of being non-poor, and a reduction of the inequality of the same probabilities in 
countries with high average probabilities of being non-poor. In some cases, as in Luxembourg, this has driven 
an increase of the degree of stratification, which means that the probabilities of being non-poor in Luxembourg 
are less shared by individuals living in other EU countries in 2014 with respect to 2008.  
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5. Dominance conditions of the probability of being poor 
 
5.1 Extending dominance criteria to the probabilities of being non-poor 
In the previous section, the analysis of poverty, which is typically developed on a distribution censored by the 
poverty line, has been extended to the overall distribution of probabilities of being non-poor by using ANOGI. 
Thus, our analysis differs from the standard way of dealing with inequality among poor, i.e. with inequality 
calculated among individuals that are below a poverty line, to favour a global view of the inequality of 
probabilities and thus a measure of the concentration of non-poor individuals. 
In this section, using the same approach, a step further is done to investigate to what extent the ranking of 
countries according to the probability of being poor can be translated into wider social norms. To perform this 
task, we use the dominance criterion related to the generalised Lorenz dominance technique. To build this 
process, as before, we still use the complement of the estimated individual probability of being poor as an 
indicator of the position in the income distribution. In particular, individuals in each country can be ordered 
from the lowest to the highest probability of being non-poor, where the lowest probability of being non-poor 
will be 0 and the highest probability of being non-poor will be 1. 
By ordering individuals according to this indicator, the outcome can be interpreted as an approximation of 
the usual ranking from the poorest to the richest individual. As a consequence, the dominance of the 
generalised Lorenz (GL) curve of the probabilities of individuals in country A over the generalised Lorenz 
curve of the probabilities of individuals in country B would mean that individuals in country A have less 
(probability of) poverty than individuals in country B for any fraction of the population. As in the previous 
section, the focus is on the whole distribution of probabilities – and thus on the total number of individuals – 
and not only on the distribution of probabilities of individuals below a given poverty line. 
As it is well known, however, the GL dominance is not a synthetic measure, neither of inequality nor of 
poverty, which means that uncertain outcomes between countries may occur whenever the GL curves cross. 
In order to combine GL dominance with more general social prescriptions in the analysis of multidimensional 
poverty, recourse has been made to an extension of the well-established correspondence between classes of 
social welfare functions and dominance conditions.6 
In our case, the GL dominance of a given distribution of the probabilities of being non-poor may be thought 
as more socially preferred, as the dominating distribution implies a higher probability of being non-poor for 
any fraction of the population. To this purpose, define a class of social norms L(¢) that satisfies L£(¢) > 0 
and L££(¢) < 0. These two conditions only require that the social preference is increasing in the argument 
(i.e., it increases when the probability of being non-poor increases) and concave, which means that a “transfer” 
of the probability of being non-poor from a higher to a lower probability would increase the social preference.7 
Thus, GL dominance would allow general conclusions when comparing social preferences without the need 
to specify an exact functional form for L(¢). 
                                                        
6 See for all Lambert (1993) and Deaton (1997). 
7 It is worth noting that this second condition is simply a restatement of the principle of transfers that holds when income is the argument 
of a social welfare function, and that fundamentally embodies aversion to inequality. 
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As described above, however, GL dominance may not occur; rather, GL curves may cross. This outcome 
would prevent to draw unanimous conclusions about which distribution of probabilities should be socially 
preferred. Yet, some conclusions may be achieved with the additional requirement that L£££(¢) > 0. This 
feature corresponds to the principle of diminishing transfer, which means that an increase of the probability of 
being non-poor at lower levels of this probability increases social preference more than an increase of the same 
probability at higher levels. 
In this case, the focus is shifted on the dominance in the lowest part of the distribution, that in our case 
would mean to focus on the part of the population where the lowest probabilities of being non-poor are 
concentrated. In particular, if X§• >† X§¶ , where the symbol >† means that the distribution / intersect the 
distribution ß from above at a given point, the distribution / will be socially preferred if two conditions are 
met (mean-variance condition): 
 
(17) ®• < ®¶ 
 
(18) ©•# < ©¶# − (®¶ − ®•)(2q − ®¶ − ®•) 
 
where q is the maximum probability of being non-poor, which is equal to 1. Condition (17) simply states that 
the mean of the distribution / (®•) must be lower than the mean of the distribution ß (®¶). Condition (18) 
requires that the variance of the distribution / (©•#) must be sufficiently lower than the variance of the 
distribution ß (©¶#). It is also worth noting that if the mean level of the two distributions were equal, the only 
relevant condition would be ©•# < ©¶#, i.e. that the variance of / is lower than the variance of ß. 
When either of the two conditions does not hold, no general conclusions in terms of social preference would 
be possible. When both hold, instead, one can go a step further to measure the robustness of the social ranking 
to the degree of inequality-poverty aversion. This can be done by calculating a lower limit of that aversion 
below which social unanimous prescriptions obtained by GL no longer hold. This lower bound is given by: 
 
(19) h = q(®¶ − ®•)v©¶# − ©•#w − (®¶ − ®•)v2q − ®¶ − ®•w 
 
The calculation of h is potentially important to understand the robustness of the ranking in terms of 
consensus across different decision makers with different (and unknown) degrees of inequality-poverty 
aversion. To this purpose, the larger the difference ™v©¶# − ©•#w − (®¶ − ®•)(2q − ®¶ − ®•)´, the nearer to 
zero will be the lower bound of equation (3). Since h = 0 would connote inequality neutrality, the larger the 
gap, the greater is the class of L(¢) for which the result will hold. 
This methodology represents a novel approach to combine poverty analysis and dominance criteria, as it 
combines a value-free method of estimating the probabilities of being non-poor with a value-free way of 
determining social preferences that directly connect poverty levels and the inequality in their distributions. 
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With the exception of a recent contribution by Aaberge et al. (2019), this is also the first attempt to apply 
dominance criteria to the issue of multidimensional poverty. Our contribution, however, differs from that by 
Aaberge et al. (2019), as in that case the analysis is based on a deprivation count distribution where no attempt 
is made to aggregate the count into a synthetic multidimensional poverty index at individual level. In our 
analysis, instead, the deprivation count distribution is the baseline to calculate the probability of each 
individual to be below a given poverty threshold. This difference allows us to apply dominance criteria directly 
considering the whole distribution of probabilities obtained by aggregating the dimensions of poverty with 
10,000 different vectors of weights; while in Aaberge et al. (2019), the dominance is sequentially applied 
(either downward or upward) by progressively adding fractions of populations with a different number of 
deprivations. 
 
5.2 GL dominance and GL crossings 
The outcome of the Lorenz dominance for the probability of being among the poorest 20% of the European 
population is reported in Table 9 for all years. Each panel can be easily read by rows. For example, in 2008, 
Austrian individuals have always a lower probability (“Lower”) of being among the poorest 20% of the 
European population than any other country, with the exception of France. For Italian individuals, instead, this 
probability is lower only compared to Portugal, while crossings occur with Belgium, Greece, Spain, and 
Luxembourg. At the same time, individuals from Greece and Portugal have the highest probability of being 
widely represented in the poorest 20%, as a lower probability does not appear in any comparison. 
The analysis is replicated in each year, and gives evidence of the changes occurred in the ranking of 
probabilities among countries. In particular, in the panel of year 2014, changes with respect to 2008 are 
highlighted. Changes occur in each country, with a slight improvement of the relative position only in Italy, 
Luxembourg, and Portugal. A slightly worse comparative outcome can instead be traced in Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, Greece, Spain, and France. Finally, in the UK, a relative improvement occurs with respect to Austria, 
while the relative position worsens with respect to Luxembourg. 
In terms of social preferences, the conclusions are readily obtained. By considering the last year of the 
analysis, 2014, since “Lower” corresponds to all cases where the GL curve of the probabilities of being non-
poor in the country in row dominates the GL curve of the same probabilities in the country in column, the 
social preference as measured by any member of the class L = {L:L£(¢) > 0;L££(¢) < 0} is always for 
the distribution of probabilities in the country in row. It is worth noting that the dominance also implies that 
the social preference will be higher regardless of any specific poverty line below the income level 
corresponding to the richest individual among the lowest 20% of the distribution. The opposite holds in the 
case where the matrix is filled by “Higher”.  
Uncertain outcomes, instead, occur when GL curves cross (“Crossing”). To solve this uncertainty, we first 
identify the comparisons between countries where the dominance occurs in the lowest part of the distribution 
(i.e. before the intersection, from above). This happens in the following cases: X§à≠ >† X§êÆ ; X§à≠ >† X§ØÆ; 
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X§à≠ >† X§ó∞; X§±≤ >† X§†≠; X§±≤ >† X§ØÆ ; X§±≤ >† X§ó∞; X§°≠ >† X§êÆ ; X§°≠ >† X§ØÆ ; X§°≠ >† X§Æ± ; X§°≠ >† X§ÆÑ; X§≤≥ >† X§†≠; X§≤≥ >† X§êÆ ; X§≤≥ >† X§ØÆ ; X§≤≥ >† X§ó∞. 
In all comparisons, both conditions (17) and (18) are satisfied, which means that the dominating distribution 
is socially preferred for any member of the restricted class L = {L:L£(¢) > 0;L££(¢) < 0;L£££(¢) > 0}. 
More importantly, as shown in Table 10, the values of h, as in equation (19), are calculated. For example, the 
dominance of Italy over France will embody a social preference for degrees of inequality-poverty aversion 
higher than 0.779. As can be easily seen, some crossings correspond to a higher social preference only for 
degrees of inequality-poverty aversion greater than 1, as in the cases of Portugal vs. Greece, Portugal vs. Spain, 
and Greece vs. Spain. 
It is worth stressing, at this point, that this outcome is particularly important in the analysis of poverty, as 
it allows a double stronger conclusion with respect to the existing literature. The first derives from the fact that 
the probabilities of being multidimensional poor are estimated without making recourse to a specific set of 
weights; the second derives from the fact that the social welfare implications are not constrained by a specific 
functional form of the social preference. In other terms, the ranking among countries according to their level 
of poverty that is here obtained is loaded by the minimum set of arbitrary choices, in terms of weighting the 
various dimensions of poverty, to estimate the distribution of the individual probabilities of being non-poor, 
and in terms of transforming this distribution of individual probabilities to derive social preferences. 
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Table 9 – The probability of being among the poorest 20% using GL dominance 
 
 
Source: Authors’ elaborations  
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Table 10 – Lower bound of inequality aversion 
 
Source: Authors’ elaborations 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper proposes a multidimensional poverty analysis in 10 European countries which introduces two main 
innovations compared with the previous literature: first, the dimensions are defined on the basis of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union with the aim of avoiding any exogenous definition of poverty; 
second, the whole space of feasible (positive) weights is used to summarise the multidimensional information, 
in order to remain agnostic about the importance given to the different dimensions. 
From a methodological perspective, this paper exploited the Hierarchy Stochastic Multi-Objective 
Acceptability Analysis (HSMAA) which has four main advantages comparted with other techniques: it allows 
to explore the whole set of feasible weights by Monte Carlo generation; it allows to quantify the volume of 
vectors of weights by which each individual get a specific position in ranking; it does not suffer the curse of 
dimensionality; and it allows to consider nested features in multidimensional poverty measures. In other words, 
by means of HSMAA the uncertainty in weights is dealt with, but the probability that each dimension be 
important into the composition of the final index is independent from the number of indicators used to measure 
it. 
Using data from four waves of EU-SILC (2008, 2010, 2012, 2014), the methodological innovations 
introduced here has allowed to produce a family of measures of multidimensional deprivation which capture 
the individual probability of being among the poorest 20%, the 10% and the 5% of the EU population. These 
probabilities are analysed at country level, in terms of both average levels and inequality, and are finally 
combined with the generalised Lorenz dominance techniques in order to derive socially preferred distributions 
with the minimum load of value judgments. 
Results show that the individual probability of being among the poorest 20% have median zero for all 
countries with the exceptions of Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy. In particular, in Greece, Spain, and Portugal, 
there is a significant number of individuals who have 100% probability of being among the poorest 20% of 
the population regardless of the weighting scheme applied to the set of multidimensional deprivation 
indicators. On the contrary, in Austria, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the UK the probability distributions 
of being among the poorest 20% are shorter, and the presence of large outliers means that the weights attached 
 31 
to the deprivation indicators can significantly change the probability of being considered multidimensional 
poor.  
The multidimensional generalization of the Analysis of Gini (ANOGI) shows that from 2008 to 2014, total 
inequality among individuals in the 10 EU countries considered here has not changed significantly, but it is 
also shown that this outcome is the result of conflicting paths of a decreasing within inequality and of an 
increasing between inequality of the probabilities of being non-poor. 
The increase of between inequality can be partially explained by an increase of the average probability of 
being non-poor in countries having a higher average probability of being non-poor in 2008 (Austria, 
Luxembourg and France in particular), and a reduction of the average probability of being non-poor in 
countries having a lower average probability of being non-poor in 2008 (i.e. Portugal, Spain, and Greece). 
Furthermore, as an overall tendency, there is evidence of an increase of inequality within countries with low 
average probabilities of being non-poor, and a reduction of inequality in countries with a high average 
probability of being non-poor.  
Finally, the outcome of the pairwise Lorenz dominance show that in 2008 Austrian individuals have always 
a lower probability of being among the poorest 20% of the European population than any other country, with 
the exception of France. On the contrary, in the same year, the distribution of probabilities in Greece and 
Portugal never dominates other countries.  
Overall, the methodology here applied can shed new light on the multidimensional poverty analysis by 
moving from a dual definition of poverty, where poor and non-poor individuals are classified in a mutually 
exclusive context, to a continuous measure of deprivation given by the probability of being poor. These 
methodological innovations allow to capture both the extensive and intensive margin of multidimensional 
poverty. The framework proposed here can be applied in any setting where either count, or continuous data 
are available. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1 – Probabilities of being among the poorest 10% of the population 
Year mean sd p25 p50 p75 
% population 
with 
Prob10%>0 
Average N of 
deprivations if 
Prob10%>0 
 AT 
2008 0.070 0.21 0 0 0 22.5 7 
2010 0.075 0.22 0 0 0 24.7 7 
2012 0.064 0.20 0 0 0 23.0 7 
2014 0.062 0.20 0 0 0 27.1 7 
 BE 
2008 0.104 0.26 0 0 0.003 29.7 7 
2010 0.111 0.26 0 0 0.003 32.4 7 
2012 0.113 0.27 0 0 0.003 33.2 7 
2014 0.112 0.27 0 0 0.003 34.7 8 
 DE 
2008 0.086 0.24 0 0 0.002 28.2 7 
2010 0.085 0.24 0 0 0.002 27.3 7 
2012 0.079 0.23 0 0 0 27.8 7 
2014 0.083 0.23 0 0 0.002 30.8 7 
 EL 
2008 0.124 0.27 0 0 0.031 38.7 7 
2010 0.131 0.27 0 0 0.084 42.1 7 
2012 0.160 0.30 0 0 0.141 48.2 7 
2014 0.144 0.30 0 0 0.066 46.9 7 
 ES 
2008 0.118 0.27 0 0 0.027 35.4 7 
2010 0.127 0.28 0 0 0.028 36.9 7 
2012 0.129 0.28 0 0 0.075 36.0 7 
2014 0.152 0.31 0 0 0.066 42.9 7 
 FR 
2008 0.081 0.23 0 0 0.003 29.3 7 
2010 0.077 0.22 0 0 0.002 29.3 7 
2012 0.076 0.22 0 0 0 28.0 7 
2014 0.077 0.22 0 0 0 32.4 7 
 IT 
2008 0.111 0.26 0 0 0.006 35.2 7 
2010 0.102 0.25 0 0 0.003 33.9 7 
2012 0.108 0.26 0 0 0.016 36.6 7 
2014 0.090 0.21 0 0 0.017 41.5 7 
 LU 
2008 0.110 0.26 0 0 0.004 32.2 8 
2010 0.091 0.24 0 0 0.002 28.9 8 
2012 0.078 0.22 0 0 0.002 29.1 8 
2014 0.063 0.18 0 0 0 30.7 7 
 PT 
2008 0.122 0.27 0 0 0.031 42.5 8 
2010 0.132 0.28 0 0 0.083 43.6 8 
2012 0.137 0.29 0 0 0.066 46.7 7 
2014 0.130 0.25 0 0 0.117 54.5 7 
 UK 
2008 0.090 0.23 0 0 0.002 29.4 7 
2010 0.088 0.23 0 0 0.002 28.0 7 
2012 0.083 0.23 0 0 0 27.6 7 
2014 0.081 0.20 0 0 0.003 35.1 8 
Source: Authors’ elaborations on EU-SILC data (2008–2014) 
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Table A2 – Probabilities of being among the poorest 5% of the population 
Year mean sd p25 p50 p75 
% population 
with  
Prob5%>0 
Average N of 
deprivations if 
Prob5%>0 
 AT 
2008 0.032 0.15 0 0 0 15.4 8 
2010 0.036 0.16 0 0 0 17.1 8 
2012 0.028 0.14 0 0 0 15.0 8 
2014 0.029 0.14 0 0 0 16.6 7 
 BE 
2008 0.061 0.20 0 0 0 23.6 8 
2010 0.061 0.20 0 0 0 24.3 8 
2012 0.061 0.20 0 0 0 24.4 8 
2014 0.068 0.22 0 0 0 23.7 8 
 DE 
2008 0.051 0.19 0 0 0 19.2 8 
2010 0.049 0.19 0 0 0 19.2 8 
2012 0.042 0.17 0 0 0 18.1 8 
2014 0.044 0.18 0 0 0 19.6 8 
 EL 
2008 0.052 0.17 0 0 0 31.7 8 
2010 0.052 0.17 0 0 0 32.4 8 
2012 0.077 0.22 0 0 0.002 36.6 7 
2014 0.085 0.23 0 0 0.002 32.2 8 
 ES 
2008 0.053 0.18 0 0 0 28.5 7 
2010 0.065 0.21 0 0 0 27.9 8 
2012 0.072 0.22 0 0 0 25.6 8 
2014 0.097 0.26 0 0 0.001 30.5 7 
 FR 
2008 0.043 0.17 0 0 0 22.2 8 
2010 0.038 0.16 0 0 0 20.8 8 
2012 0.037 0.16 0 0 0 18.1 7 
2014 0.039 0.16 0 0 0 19.9 8 
 IT 
2008 0.057 0.19 0 0 0 28.1 8 
2010 0.051 0.18 0 0 0 25.0 8 
2012 0.052 0.18 0 0 0 25.7 8 
2014 0.032 0.13 0 0 0 25.3 8 
 LU 
2008 0.050 0.18 0 0 0 25.8 8 
2010 0.040 0.16 0 0 0 21.4 8 
2012 0.035 0.15 0 0 0 20.7 8 
2014 0.019 0.10 0 0 0 18.3 7 
 PT 
2008 0.058 0.19 0 0 0 35.4 8 
2010 0.062 0.20 0 0 0.002 32.2 8 
2012 0.065 0.20 0 0 0.002 35.0 8 
2014 0.051 0.16 0 0 0.003 38.1 8 
 UK 
2008 0.040 0.16 0 0 0 18.7 8 
2010 0.042 0.17 0 0 0 19.0 8 
2012 0.040 0.16 0 0 0 18.6 7 
2014 0.023 0.11 0 0 0 23.3 9 
Source: Authors’ elaborations on EU-SILC data (2008–2014) 
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Table A3 – Multidimensional ANOGI of Upward cumulative rank acceptability index for the top 10% EU poverty 
Year Total Inequality Standard WI Impact of overlapping on WI Standard BI 
Impact of 
overlapping on BI 
2008 0.099 0.014 0.085 0.010 -0.009 
2010 0.099 0.013 0.086 0.012 -0.011 
2012 0.099 0.012 0.085 0.016 -0.014 
2014 0.100 0.012 0.085 0.019 -0.016 
Source: Authors’ elaborations on EU-SILC data (2008–2014) 
 
Table A4 – Multidimensional ANOGI of Upward cumulative rank acceptability index for the top 5% EU poverty 
Year Total Inequality Standard WI Impact of overlapping on WI Standard BI 
Impact of 
overlapping on BI 
2008 0.049 0.007 0.042 0.004 -0.004 
2010 0.051 0.006 0.043 0.006 -0.005 
2012 0.050 0.006 0.043 0.009 -0.008 
2014 0.051 0.006 0.043 0.015 -0.013 
Source: Authors’ elaborations on EU-SILC data (2008–2014) 
 
Table A5 – Detailed statistics of inequality in Upward cumulative rank acceptability index for the top 10% EU 
poverty for subgroups (2008) 
Country N p mean s G O 
AT 10846 0.061 0.930 0.064 0.068 1.059 
BE 10073 0.057 0.896 0.057 0.101 1.034 
DE 22834 0.129 0.914 0.132 0.084 1.038 
EL 13486 0.076 0.876 0.075 0.119 0.952 
ES 27784 0.157 0.882 0.155 0.114 0.984 
FR 19493 0.110 0.919 0.113 0.079 1.015 
IT 42532 0.241 0.889 0.239 0.108 0.982 
LU 7486 0.042 0.890 0.042 0.106 1.010 
PT 8505 0.048 0.878 0.047 0.118 0.921 
UK 13479 0.076 0.910 0.077 0.087 1.017 
Note: N= Number of observations; p = share of population; mean = average Upward cumulative rank acceptability 
index; s = share of probability of being above 20% of poverty; G = Gini coefficients; O = average overlapping. 
Source: Authors’ elaborations on EU-SILC data (2008) 
 
  
 38 
Table A6 – Detailed statistics of inequality in Upward cumulative rank acceptability index for the top 5% EU 
poverty for subgroups (2008) 
Country N p mean s G O 
AT 10846 0.061 0.968 0.063 0.031 1.044 
BE 10073 0.057 0.939 0.056 0.060 1.012 
DE 22834 0.129 0.949 0.129 0.050 1.037 
EL 13486 0.076 0.948 0.076 0.051 0.964 
ES 27784 0.157 0.947 0.157 0.052 0.977 
FR 19493 0.110 0.957 0.111 0.042 1.018 
IT 42532 0.241 0.943 0.239 0.056 0.985 
LU 7486 0.042 0.950 0.042 0.049 1.010 
PT 8505 0.048 0.942 0.048 0.056 0.951 
UK 13479 0.076 0.960 0.077 0.040 1.026 
Note: N = Number of observations; p = Share of population; mean = Average Upward cumulative rank acceptability 
index; s = Share of probability of being above 20% of poverty; G = Gini coefficients; O = Average overlapping. 
Source: Authors’ elaborations on EU-SILC data (2008) 
 
Table A7 – Overlapping matrix of Upward cumulative rank acceptability index for the top 10% EU poverty (2008) 
 AT BE DE EL ES FR IT LU PT UK 
AT 1 1.027 1.03 1.097 1.069 1.05 1.075 1.043 1.129 1.044 
BE 0.966 1 0.997 1.081 1.05 1.017 1.052 1.024 1.111 1.015 
DE 0.967 1.004 1 1.088 1.055 1.021 1.058 1.028 1.119 1.017 
EL 0.889 0.919 0.914 1 0.969 0.936 0.97 0.943 1.027 0.935 
ES 0.92 0.951 0.947 1.031 1 0.968 1.002 0.975 1.06 0.967 
FR  0.949 0.982 0.979 1.063 1.031 1 1.034 1.005 1.093 0.996 
IT 0.916 0.948 0.943 1.031 0.999 0.964 1 0.973 1.058 0.963 
LU 0.948 0.977 0.975 1.056 1.026 0.995 1.028 1 1.084 0.995 
PT 0.852 0.887 0.879 0.974 0.94 0.9 0.941 0.914 1 0.901 
UK 0.954 0.984 0.984 1.06 1.029 1.005 1.034 1.002 1.091 1 
Source: Authors’ elaborations on EU-SILC data (2008–2014) 
 
Table A8 – Overlapping matrix of Upward cumulative rank acceptability index for the top 5% EU poverty (2008) 
 AT BE DE EL ES FR IT LU PT UK 
AT  1 1.031 1.009 1.08 1.067 1.027 1.059 1.034 1.092 1.017 
BE  0.964 1 0.976 1.048 1.035 0.993 1.028 1.002 1.061 0.984 
DE  0.987 1.025 1 1.074 1.061 1.017 1.054 1.026 1.088 1.008 
EL  0.922 0.951 0.929 1 0.988 0.948 0.978 0.954 1.011 0.938 
ES  0.933 0.964 0.941 1.013 1 0.96 0.991 0.966 1.024 0.95 
FR  0.971 1.006 0.982 1.055 1.042 1 1.034 1.008 1.067 0.99 
IT  0.94 0.972 0.948 1.022 1.009 0.967 1 0.974 1.034 0.958 
LU  0.965 0.997 0.974 1.048 1.034 0.993 1.026 1 1.059 0.983 
PT  0.906 0.939 0.915 0.988 0.976 0.934 0.967 0.941 1 0.924 
UK  0.983 1.012 0.99 1.063 1.05 1.01 1.041 1.016 1.075 1 
Source: Authors’ elaborations on EU-SILC data (2008–2014) 
Table A9 – Detailed statistics of inequality in Upward cumulative rank acceptability index for the top 10% EU 
poverty for subgroups (2014) 
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Country N p mean s G O 
AT 10651 0.058 0.938 0.061 0.06 1.081 
BE 11236 0.061 0.888 0.061 0.11 1.065 
DE 21462 0.117 0.917 0.12 0.081 1.076 
EL 17768 0.097 0.856 0.093 0.139 0.955 
ES 26049 0.142 0.848 0.135 0.148 1.01 
FR 20659 0.113 0.923 0.116 0.075 1.046 
IT 38604 0.211 0.91 0.214 0.085 0.943 
LU 7891 0.043 0.937 0.045 0.06 1.016 
PT 14579 0.08 0.87 0.077 0.121 0.849 
UK 14013 0.077 0.919 0.078 0.077 0.996 
Note: N = Number of observations; p = Share of population; mean = Average Upward cumulative rank acceptability 
index; s = Share of probability of being above 20% of poverty; G = Gini coefficients; O = Average overlapping. 
Source: Authors’ elaborations on EU-SILC data (2008) 
 
Table A10 – Detailed statistics of inequality in Upward cumulative rank acceptability index for the top 5% EU 
poverty for subgroups (2014) 
Country N p mean s G O 
AT 10651 0.058 0.971 0.06 0.029 1.057 
BE 11236 0.061 0.932 0.06 0.067 1.023 
DE 21462 0.117 0.956 0.118 0.043 1.046 
EL 17768 0.097 0.915 0.094 0.083 0.967 
ES 26049 0.142 0.903 0.136 0.095 0.991 
FR 20659 0.113 0.961 0.114 0.038 1.037 
IT 38604 0.211 0.968 0.215 0.031 0.971 
LU 7891 0.043 0.981 0.045 0.019 0.999 
PT 14579 0.08 0.949 0.08 0.049 0.909 
UK 14013 0.077 0.977 0.079 0.023 0.987 
Note: N = Number of observations; p = Share of population; mean = Average Upward cumulative rank acceptability 
index; s = Share of probability of being above 20% of poverty; G = Gini coefficients; O = Average overlapping. 
Source: Authors’ elaborations on EU-SILC data (2008) 
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Table A11 – Overlapping matrix of Upward cumulative rank acceptability index for the top 10% EU poverty (2014) 
  AT BE DE EL ES FR IT LU PT UK 
AT 1 1.015 1.011 1.114 1.054 1.038 1.138 1.053 1.23 1.081 
BE 0.972 1 0.987 1.108 1.049 1.013 1.121 1.027 1.225 1.062 
DE 0.985 1.011 1 1.117 1.058 1.027 1.131 1.04 1.232 1.073 
EL 0.858 0.89 0.875 1 0.943 0.9 1.01 0.916 1.114 0.954 
ES 0.914 0.947 0.93 1.056 1 0.956 1.063 0.968 1.169 1.006 
FR 0.96 0.98 0.973 1.083 1.023 1 1.102 1.014 1.197 1.044 
IT 0.868 0.876 0.876 0.969 0.912 0.903 1 0.921 1.081 0.947 
LU 0.95 0.951 0.955 1.036 0.978 0.983 1.073 1 1.148 1.02 
PT 0.76 0.781 0.773 0.885 0.828 0.8 0.907 0.819 1 0.852 
UK 0.928 0.93 0.934 1.017 0.959 0.962 1.052 0.979 1.128 1 
Source: Authors’ elaborations on EU-SILC data (2014) 
 
Table A12 – Overlapping matrix of Upward cumulative rank acceptability index for the top 5% EU poverty (2014) 
 AT BE DE EL ES FR IT LU PT UK 
AT 1 1.031 1.013 1.083 1.052 1.02 1.082 1.042 1.153 1.059 
BE 0.963 1 0.977 1.054 1.024 0.984 1.046 1.004 1.121 1.021 
DE 0.984 1.025 1 1.081 1.052 1.006 1.066 1.024 1.141 1.041 
EL 0.906 0.946 0.921 1 0.971 0.927 0.989 0.946 1.063 0.964 
ES 0.928 0.972 0.944 1.028 1 0.95 1.011 0.967 1.087 0.985 
FR 0.98 1.013 0.994 1.065 1.035 1 1.061 1.021 1.132 1.038 
IT 0.925 0.939 0.934 0.982 0.951 0.94 1 0.968 1.059 0.983 
LU 0.955 0.965 0.963 1.007 0.975 0.97 1.031 1 1.089 1.014 
PT 0.858 0.879 0.869 0.926 0.897 0.876 0.937 0.9 1 0.916 
UK 0.942 0.955 0.951 0.997 0.966 0.958 1.017 0.986 1.075 1 
Source: Authors’ elaborations on EU-SILC data (2014) 
